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In 2000, two international organizations—the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) and the Organization for Economic Development (OECD)—attempted to attack 
the problems of money laundering and tax evasion through coercive soft law. Both 
organizations attempted to induce state compliance with international standards by 
placing noncompliant states on publicly available blacklists. The FATF blacklist, Non-
Cooperative Countries or Territories, documented states that failed to implement 
international anti-money laundering standards and the OECD blacklist, Uncooperative 
Tax Havens, documented states that failed to implement international tax information-
sharing agreements. This report examines the Cayman Islands’ quick compliance with 
these two international efforts. The report hypothesizes that the Cayman Islands’ 
complied quickly with both the FATF and OECD initiatives because the Cayman Islands’ 
had a strong financial institutional capacity and a high level of reputational risk from not 
complying. The report develops a methodology for testing this theory against other 
 v 
 
jurisdictions placed on both of the original FATF and OECD blacklists. The testing 
reveals that while financial institutional capacity and reputational risk may have 
contributed to the Cayman Islands’ and other states’ compliance with the FATF and 
OECD initiatives, these factors were not determinative. The report concludes that better 
metrics for state institutional capacity and reputational risk are needed to accurately 
measure states’ compliance with the FATF and OECD regimes. 
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In recent years there has been much academic and policy attention paid to 
jurisdictions deemed to be offshore financial centers (OFCs).1 Much of the academic and 
policy analysis has focused on OFCs contribution to two problems in the global financial 
system: money laundering and tax evasion.2  The majority of this attention evolved out of 
two international efforts to control these problems through the use of coercive soft law. In 
2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an organization born out of the G-7 in 
1989 to develop policy recommendations for anti-money laundering regulation, issued a 
list of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (FATF 2000). The list contained fifteen 
jurisdictions that were perceived not to be cooperative with the international community 
in adopting legislation and enforcement mechanisms to attack the problem of money 
laundering. Within the same year, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) issued a list of Uncooperative Tax Havens to attack the 
international problem of tax evasion (OECD 2000). The OECD initially identified forty-
one jurisdictions; many were unsurprisingly considered to be OFCs. Eleven 
jurisdictions—the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, 
Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. 
Vincent and Grenadine— appeared on both lists.  
                                                
1 The term here is used loosely to describe jurisdictions with low tax and regulatory burdens. Such low 
burdens are specifically designed to attract non-resident capital. For a more in-depth analysis of the 
argument regarding how to define OFCs see Palan (1999) and Zoromé (2007). 
2 Tax evasion is often confused with tax avoidance. The distinction is often very difficult to make. 
Essentially, avoidance is considered a means of legal planning to avoid paying taxes while evasion involves 
illegal means of not paying taxes, such as failure to report income. The distinction has been best described 
by Dennis Healey, the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer: “The difference between tax avoidance and 




The FATF and OECD lists were means of inducing states to comply with 
recommended policy through a name and shame approach—a form of economic coercion 
(Sharman 2006; Sharman 2010). The name and shame approach would work by publicly 
listing noncompliant jurisdictions. Listed jurisdictions would presumably suffer or be 
afraid of suffering reputational damage. Because of the mobility of capital, states 
suffering a reputational loss could also suffer a significant economic loss. Presumably, 
investors would simply invest their capital in a more compliant jurisdiction—one not on 
the publicly available blacklists. Thus, fearing these consequences states would comply 
with the FATF and OECD recommendations.  
If measuring compliance is simply a matter of head-counting, then both the FATF 
and OECD lists were largely successful.3 Of the eleven jurisdictions placed on both the 
original FATF and OECD lists, all have since been removed. In the case of the FATF list, 
all jurisdictions implemented legislation and enforcement mechanisms to attack money 
laundering. In the case of the OECD list, all jurisdictions have made commitments to 
reduce the problems associated with tax evasion.  
While all jurisdictions eventually complied, not all agreed to comply at the same 
rate. For example, while Liechtenstein almost immediately complied with the FATF 
recommendations—it was de-listed from the FATF blacklist in 2001, a year after its 
name first appeared—it dragged its feet in agreeing to the OECD initiative— 
Liechtenstein did not make a commitment to the OECD until 2009, the last of the original 
eleven to make such a commitment. Nauru, on the other hand, was not de-listed from the 
                                                
3 This is not to suggest that the measures implemented by jurisdictions actually did anything to reduce 
money laundering or tax evasion. In fact, much research has been written to expose the weaknesses of the 
FATF and OECD policy recommendations (Addison 2009; Christensen 2011; Gravelle 2009; Masciandaro 




FATF blacklist until 2005, but it made a commitment to the OECD initiative towards the 
end of 2003.  
The most rapid to commit to both initiatives was the Cayman Islands. Like 
Liechtenstein, the Cayman Islands was removed from the FATF blacklist in 2001. 
However, unlike any other jurisdiction appearing on both the original FATF and OECD 
lists, the Cayman Islands made an early commitment to the OECD in 2000 prior to the 
OECD publicly issuing its blacklist. Originally, the OECD identified forty-one 
jurisdictions to be placed on its list. Six jurisdictions—Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, 
Cyprus, Mauritius, Malta, and San Marino—wanting to ward of the negative publicity of 
publicly appearing on this list, made early information-sharing commitments with the 
OECD (Gravelle 2010, 5). It is not yet clear why the Cayman Islands acted so quickly to 
comply with both the FATF and the OECD. This paper aims to examine that question and 
provide a research agenda for further studies regarding state compliance with 
international anti-money laundering and tax evasion regimes. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section formulates a hypothesis 
regarding the behavior of the Cayman Islands and other states in complying with both the 
FATF and OECD initiatives. The second section outlines the methodology used for the 
analysis of what factors induced states to comply with the FATF and OECD initiatives. 
This section defines the variables for compliance, institutional capacity, and reputational 
risk. The third section uses the methodology to provide a focused analysis of the Cayman 
Islands. Data between the eleven jurisdictions initially appearing on both the FATF and 
OECD blacklists are compared to test the hypothesis. The final section draws conclusions 
from the analysis and develops a brief research agenda for further examination into 





A cursory examination of state compliance with the FATF and OECD regimes 
highlights the Cayman Islands as an outlier. It reacted quicker than any other state in 
responding to have its name removed from both blacklists. Neither the Cayman’s “quick” 
compliance nor the varied rates of other states’ compliance can be easily explained. An 
examination of academic literature, media reporting, government assessments, and 
international organizations’ assessments regarding the Cayman Islands reveal that the 
Cayman Islands was a successful and sophisticated OFC before the FATF and OECD 
regimes were launched (Suss et al. 2002; Palan et al. 2010, 137; GAO 2008; IMF 2005).  
When the FATF and OECD blacklists were released, the Cayman Islands had strong 
government institutions and was considered the fifth largest financial center in the world 
(Sullivan 1999). Thus, the Cayman Islands had a high (1) institutional capacity—i.e., a 
strong cadre of financial professionals (lawyers, accountants, and bankers) (GAO 2008) 
and strong government institutions (see Table 2 below for World Governance 
Indicators)—and (2) a high reputational risk—a lot to possibly lose from not complying.  
From this observation, I speculated that these two factors—institutional capacity 
and reputational risk—were possibly determinative in explaining the Cayman Islands 
“quick” compliance. Thus, the hypothesis arose in the form of two questions. The first 
directly applies to the Cayman Islands: Did the Cayman Islands comply so quickly 
because it had a (1) high degree of institutional capacity—making it easier for its 
government to implement legislative and enforcement requirements—and (2) a high 
reputational risk? If this could be answered in the affirmative, could this present a 




rates of compliance be determined by their levels of institutional capacity and 






Data & Methodology  
 To test the above hypotheses, I perform cross-jurisdictional comparisons of the 
eleven OFCs found on both the FATF and OECD blacklists. This section is divided into 
three parts. The first part defines “compliance” with regards to the FATF and OECD 
initiatives. The second part defines “institutional capacity” and provides proxy measures 
for this variable. The third part defines “reputational risk” and provides proxy measures 
and statistics for this variable. Discussions in each of the first three parts focus on the 
difficulties in defining and measuring the variables. In addition, each part concludes with 
a cross-jurisdictional table of the variables. The final section attempts to coalesce the 
findings of the previous three sections into a more understandable but very approximate 
cross-jurisdictional comparison.  
The cross-jurisdictional comparison is far from exacting. This stems largely from 
the lack of data regarding and the difficulty in measuring compliance, financial 
institutional capacity, and reputational risk. Thus, the comparison is meant only as a 
supplement to reveal whether patterns emerge from the data. The comparison is not 
meant as a precise analytical and predictive tool.  
COMPLIANCE 
Compliance in the context of the FATF and OECD blacklists is defined as 
removal from either list. Removal is a signal by the organization—the FATF or OECD—
that the state made a commitment to legislative and regulatory reform. In the case of the 
OECD initiative, states submitted letters of commitment, which can be found on the 




reforms for information sharing regarding tax evasion/avoidance. Once the OECD 
received a commitment, the state was considered to be cooperative—no longer on the 
blacklist. The FATF, having broader regulatory and monitoring powers, removed states 
from their blacklist only after auditing the state’s progress in implementing legislation 
and regulatory reforms.  
Admittedly, removal from the lists is an imperfect measure. Institutional 
requirements for removal may have been weakened from the publication of the original 
lists. For example, by the time Liechtenstein committed to the OECD initiative in 2009, 
the OECD had significantly reduced the recommendations/requirements it placed on 
states. As Sharman details, this weakening of the OECD initiative was brought about by 
states challenging the legitimacy of the OECD initiative (2006). Thus, when the Cayman 
Islands committed to the OECD initiative it was held to higher tax-sharing standards, 
representing a higher degree of compliance than Liechtenstein who agreed to comply 
later.  
Moreover, a state’s commitment to FATF or OECD policy does not necessarily 
represent actual enforcement of recommended or implemented legislation and 
regulations. As Masciandaro notes, a state may implement the required policy to be 
removed from the international blacklist, but may do nothing to enforce such policies 
(2005). He calls such behavior the “false friend” effect. Despite these weaknesses, 
removal from the lists provides the best and easiest proxy of state compliance. The eleven 






Jurisdiction FATF de-listing Commitment to OECD 
Tax Measures 
The Bahamas 6/22/01 3/15/02 
The Cayman Islands 6/22/01 5/18/00 
The Cook Islands 2/1/05 3/22/02 
Dominica 10/11/02 6/25/05 
Liechtenstein 6/22/01 3/12/09 
The Marshall Islands 10/11/02 7/17/07 
Nauru 10/1/05 12/3/03 
Niue 10/11/02 4/11/02 
Panama 6/22/01 4/15/02 
St. Kitts & Nevis 6/21/02 3/5/02 
St. Vincent & Grenadine 6/11/03 2/26/02 
Table 1: Dates of Compliance 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
Several measures exist for state institutional capacity. Most often these measures 
look to the ability of the state to implement and enforce laws. These measures also have a 
tendency to coalesce around democratic accountability—are citizens allowed to speak 
and gather freely, is the bureaucracy captured by corruption, is there political stability 
with the governing regime? Broader measures such as these may be capable of indicating 
exogenous decision-making. For example, investors are more likely to move capital to 
jurisdictions with overall high governance ratings. However, such broad measures are 




regulations, like those of the FATF and the OECD. For example, a state may have very 
low accountability measures—e.g., citizens may lack the ability to criticize the 
government—but may have a very advanced financial system. One need only look to 
several of the Middle Eastern states for such an example.  
 To guard against this, I have chosen four measures that attempt to more narrowly 
construe each jurisdiction’s “financial institutional” capacity. I believe and the literature 
suggests that successful OFCs require an advanced cadre of professionals—lawyers and 
accountants (Sharman 2006, 2008; Palan et al. 2010). Such professionals are needed to 
develop and maintain regulatory gaps to exploit the movement of global capital. With the 
focus on these professionals as the backbone of an OFC, I have chosen GNI per capita 
and three World Governance Indicators—“Rule of Law”, “Regulatory Quality”, and 
“Government Effectiveness”—as measurements of each jurisdiction’s institutional 
capacity to respond to international pressures to reform their financial system. These four 
variables are not perfect proxies, but they were the best available for this case study—i.e., 
there were sufficient data points for most of the jurisdictions to make a cross-
jurisdictional comparison possible.  
GNI per Capita 
GNI per capita reflects the average income of a state’s citizens. I have chosen this 
measure based on the assumption that a successful OFC with strong institutional capacity 
will have a strong community of financial professionals. These financial professionals—
lawyers, accountants, and bankers—will likely require high incomes for their services 
(Sharman 2006, 2008; Palan et al. 2010). GNI per capita, while not a perfect indicator, is 
provides a window into the strength of this sector. GNI per capita for the Cayman’s is 




undiversified economy—mainly financial services and tourism—and a small population 
(54,878). Thus, the high incomes ($52,500) of Cayman citizens in 2000 likely represents 
capture by high-income professionals. On the other hand, Panama has a much more 
diverse economy and a much larger population (3,595,490). Panama’s GNI per capita 
figure ($3,730) is likely to indicate much less about the robustness of its financial 
professionals.4 
World Governance Indicators 
The WGI are “a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of 
governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a 
number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations, and private sector firms” (World Bank 2012). Admittedly, the WGIs are 
not perfect proxies for institutional capacity because they represent survey respondents’ 
perspectives rather than a jurisdiction’s reality.5 Moreover, some jurisdictions’ WGIs are 
made more robust by the number of surveys conducted. For example, the WGIs for the 
Bahamas are derived from multiple sources, whereas the WGIs for the Cook Islands are 
derived from a single source.6 Despite these weaknesses, the WGIs of each jurisdiction 
                                                
4 An IMF Assessment of Panama in 2007 did find that “there [were] about 9,000 lawyers and company 
service providers and 12,000 accountants” engaged in servicing the formation of corporations and trusts for 
both domestic and foreign clients (IMF 2007, 7). 
5 Because of this gap between perception and reality, I originally considered using the WGI metrics as 
measures of each jurisdictions reputation. The lack of capacity indicators and the Murray et al. study led me 
to believe that the WGI would best serve as proxies for institutional capacity rather than reputation. 
6 A state’s WGIs can readily be found by conducting a search on the following World Bank website: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp. Each WGI indicator will reveal the sources from 
which it was obtained. The Bahamas’ WGI for “Government Effectiveness” was obtained from Global 
Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (2000) and Political Risk Services International Country 
Risk Guide (2000). The Bahamas’ WGI for “Regulatory Quality” was obtained from the latter two sources 
in addition to the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (2000). The Bahamas’ WGI for “Rule 




provide a good proxy for institutional capacity—the IMF has used the WGIs as proxies 
for measuring “institutional absorptive capacity”, the ability of a jurisdiction to absorb 
IMF technical assistance (Murray et al. 2009, 8–9).  
Of all the WGI measures, I have chosen Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and 
Government Effectiveness because I feel that these best represent factors affecting a 
jurisdiction’s financial sector. The Rule of Law indicator “captur[es] perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2010, 4). The 
Regulatory Quality indicator “captur[es] perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development” (Ibid.). The Government Effectiveness indicator “captur[es] 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” 
(Ibid.). 
 The figures for institutional capacity are listed in the table below. 
  
  
                                                                                                                                            
& Political Terror Scale (2000). On the other hand, the Cook Islands’ WGIs for “Government 
Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, and “Rule of Law” are all derived from a single source, the Asian 

























The Bahamas 20,350 1.25/86.6 1.13/85.3 1.25/87.8 
The Cayman 
Islands 52,500 1.49/91.9 1.23/88.7 1.94/95.1 
The Cook Islands N/A 0.66/70.8 0.36/63.2 0.07/60.5 
Dominica 3,410 0.62/68.9 0.44/65.7 0.39/67.3 
Liechtenstein 79,660 1.50/92.3 1.48/92.6 1.68/90.7 
The Marshall 
Islands 2,850 0.01/51.7 (-0.70)/22.5 (-0.84)/19 
Nauru N/A 0.85/78.0 N/A N/A 
Niue N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Panama 3,730 (-0.20)/44.5 0.56/69.1 0.24/62.4 
St. Kitts & Nevis 7,340 0.85/75.6 0.21/59.8 (-0.09)/53.2 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadine 3,070 0.85/75.6 0.21/59.8 0.06/59.5 
Table 2: Institutional Capacity 
REPUTATIONAL RISK 
Reputational risk “is the potential that negative publicity regarding an institution’s 
business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the customer base, costly 
litigation, or revenue reductions” (Federal Reserve 2011, 4.5).7 As defined by the Federal 
                                                
7 The Bank of International Settlements provides a very similar definition of reputational risk: “the risk 
arising from the negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-
holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to 
maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued accesses to sources of funding” 




Reserve, the concept of reputational risk seems very straightforward. However, 
measuring reputation, the exposure to a downgrade of reputation, and the economic costs 
of such a downgrade are much more difficult (for the difficulties of measuring and 
managing such risks in private firms see Eccles et al. 2007; Young & Hasler 2010). 
Indeed, there is a substantial lack of academic literature regarding the reputational risks 
states (rather than private firms) face when attempting to attract foreign capital.  
Before explaining the measurements I have used, I must first address why 
reputational risk is an important consideration for OFC jurisdictions. Most of the 
literature regarding OFCs assumes that capital is mobile between jurisdictions; thus, 
OFCs are not only competing with onshore jurisdictions for capital but also with other 
OFC jurisdictions (Desai et al. 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Dharmapala, 2008; Johannesen, 
2010). Another assumption follows from the notion that capital is mobile: to attract 
capital OFCs have a vested interest in appearing law-abiding (Masciandaro 2005, 2008). 
This latter assumption may seem counterintuitive for the two types of conduct the FATF 
and OECD initiatives were attempting to tackle—money-laundering and tax 
evasion/avoidance.  
However, customers of OFC services are sensitive to an OFC’s reputation 
because they have a strong interest in keeping their activities out of the limelight of 
national and international regulators.  While these customers may prefer to hide their 
assets—e.g., in the case of laundering drug money, they want to be able to eventually 
utilize these assets in the mainstream economy (de Willebois et al. 2011). These 
customers will not be serviced to have their assets placed in a jurisdiction with such a 




Thus, OFC jurisdictions wishing to attract the most capital—this includes capital 
earned from legitimate and illegitimate activities—will wish to appear law-abiding. 
However, to be considered an OFC, the jurisdiction will want to situate its legal and 
regulatory regime between no regulation and the stricter regulations of onshore 
jurisdictions (Masciandaro 2008). I call the optimum spot between no regulation and 
strict regulation the “regulatory sweet spot”. In a macroeconomic view of the “sweet 
spot”, all OFCs will be driven towards the same point. A microeconomic view of OFC 
incentives may reveal that OFCs have different “sweet spots” because they cater to 
clientele with different preferences. For example, as I explain in more detail below, it is 
likely that Liechtenstein dragged its feet so significantly on the OECD initiative—it did 
not commit until 2009—because its client base valued bank secrecy much higher than the 
client bases of other jurisdictions. However, this does not mean that Liechtenstein had no 
incentive to appear law-abiding, simply that Liechtenstein valued bank secrecy over the 
information exchange required by the OECD initiative.  
Ideally, to measure the risk question, I would ask two questions: (1) what is the 
likelihood that a reputational downgrade from the FATF and OECD blacklists would lead 
to a jurisdiction’s loss of OFC business and (2) what is the potential loss—both in total 
value and as a percentage of GDP—from a reputational downgrade? However, answering 
these two questions is made difficult because of the inadequacy of data regarding (1) 
client preferences and (2) OFC activities. As mentioned earlier, clients of one OFC may 
have completely different preferences from clients of another OFC. These differences in 
preferences will also cause differences in exposure to risk. For example, if Liechtenstein 




Liechtenstein will not be exposed to any risk from not complying with the OECD 
initiative.  
Identifying client types and client preferences is made more difficult by the lack 
of data regarding OFC activities in the period prior to the FATF and OECD initiatives. 
Data regarding OFCs remains a point of difficulty to this day. While most OFC 
jurisdictions on this list have improved data reporting since the OECD and FATF 
initiatives, there are still many gaps in data regarding OFCs. For example, only three of 
the jurisdictions in this list currently report to the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS)—the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and Panama (BIS 2012b). The Cayman 
Islands and the Bahamas have been members of the BIS since 1983, which may give 
some indication of their institutional capacity to monitor and regulate their financial 
institutions. Panama only began reporting to the BIS in 2002. While BIS reporting is not 
definitive, the reporting gives greater insight into jurisdictions’ bank assets and liabilities 
(Palan et al. 2010). Without such aggregate reporting, it is difficult to quantify an OFC’s 
bank holdings. Numbers of entities—banks, companies, trusts, hedge funds—may 
overestimate or underestimate the amount of wealth held in a particular jurisdiction. As 
Palan et al. have noted better data collection and transparency of OFC activities needs to 
occur (2010).  
To simplify the reputational risk question, I have chosen to look to figures that 
attempt to demonstrate both the scale of OFC business in a jurisdiction and the possible 
sensitivity of the jurisdiction to a reputational downgrade. Unfortunately, data is not 
readily available regarding the OFC contribution to GDP of each jurisdiction. In its place, 
I have chosen to give a raw picture of the scale of each jurisdiction’s OFC by using two 




number of international business companies (IBCs) and (2) the number of licensed 
offshore banks. This data was collected and provided by the US State Department’s 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCS Report) for the year 2000. The 
focus of the INCS Report is money laundering, rather than tax evasion/avoidance. 
Nonetheless, the data points give a good idea of the size OFC business in each 
jurisdiction for the year 2000. Admittedly the number of IBCs and offshore banks do not 
provide a complete picture of the size or type of OFC business in each jurisdiction. 
Notably lacking from the table below are figures showing the numbers of other types of 
offshore entities, i.e., insurance companies, trusts, mutual/hedge funds.  Nonetheless, the 
two metrics give a strong proxy of the size of a jurisdiction’s OFC business relative to 
others.  
To measure a jurisdiction’s sensitivity to a reputational downgrade, I have chosen 
two metrics: percent of government revenues coming from the OFC sector and 
employment statistics for each jurisdiction’s financial sector. These measurements were 
gathered from multiple sources, including the excellent study by Suss et al. of Caribbean 
OFCs (2002) and IMF assessments of some individual jurisdictions. These measures 
should provide a strong proxy for how a jurisdiction will behave to a threat to its 
reputation. Presumably, a jurisdiction whose labor force is more tied into the financial 
sector and whose government revenues are more closely tied to its OFC sector will more 




















The Bahamas 100,000 413 0.9i 14,000i/9% 
The Cayman Islands 50,951 570 14.6i 2,959/11%ii 
The Cook Islands 1230 25 4iii 80/>1%iii 
Dominica 6596 6 0.7i 100/>1%i 
Liechtenstein 75,000 15 30iv 2000/7%iv 
The Marshall Islands 4,000 0 N/A N/A 
Nauru N/A 400 N/A N/A 
Niue 5,500 5 N/A N/A 
Panama 372,667 34 N/A 27,300/3%v 
St. Kitts & Nevis 19,500 1 2.8i 100>1%i 
St. Vincent & Grenadine 11,000 28 1.4i N/A 
Table 3: Reputational Risk 
i. These figures are taken from the excellent study on Caribbean OFCs conducted for the IMF by Suss et al. 
(2002, 16–31). 
ii. The percentage comes from an IMF financial stability assessment from 2005 that states the following: 
“There are no current estimates of employment in the financial sector, but in 1998 the banking and 
insurance sectors together provided 11 percent of employment.” (10). The number of employees was 
extrapolated from the total labor pool as reported on the ILO website. 
iii. (IMF 2004, 9). 
iv. (IMF 2006, 60). 
v. (IMF 2003, 10). 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CROSS SECTIONAL COMPARISON 
To present a clearer picture of all the data I have developed a simple table (Table 




its reputational risk. The table below is meant to serve merely as a visual proxy for 
assessing each jurisdiction’s institutional capacity and reputational risk. 
 






to OECD tax 
measures 
The Bahamas High Medium 6/22/01 3/15/02 
The Cayman Islands High High 6/22/01 5/18/00 
The Cook Islands Low Medium 2/1/05 3/22/02 
Dominica Low Low 10/11/02 6/25/05 
Liechtenstein High High 6/22/01 3/12/09 
The Marshall Islands Low N/A 10/11/02 7/17/07 
Nauru N/A N/A 10/1/05 12/3/03 
Niue N/A N/A 10/11/02 4/11/02 
Panama Medium Mediumiii 6/22/01 4/15/02 
St. Kitts and Nevis Medium Medium 6/21/02 3/5/02 
St. Vincent & Grenadine Low Mediumiv 6/11/03 2/26/02 
Table 4: An Overview of the Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison 
i. Institutional Capacity was measured as an average of the weights given to each individual variable, i.e., 
GNI per capita and the WGI indicators. Scores for each were assigned accordingly: High = 3; Medium = 2; 
and Low = 1. GNI per capita above $10,000 was scored as High; GNI per capita between $5,000 and 
$10,000 was scored as Medium, and GNI per capita of below $5,000 was scored as Low. WGI scores 
above the 80th percentile were considered High, those between the 60th and 80th percentile were considered 
Medium, and those that fell below the 60th percentile were considered Low. Aggregate scores were rounded 
up. For example, Panama’s aggregate score was a 1.5 but was rounded up to a 2 making its Institutional 
Capacity appear as Medium. 
ii. Reputational Risk was accumulated using only two variables—Percent of Government Revenues and 
Percent of Labor Force Employed in Financial Sector. Scores for each were assigned accordingly: High = 
3; Medium = 2; and Low = 1. For both variables, percentages above 5% were coded as High, between 1% 
and 5% as Medium, and below 1% as Low. Aggregate scores were rounded up. 
iii. I have scored Panama as Medium despite having no data regarding its OFC’s contributions to 
government revenues. 






If one were to look only at the Cayman Islands within the cross-jurisdictional 
chart (Table 4), the hypothesis that high institutional capacity and high reputational risk 
led to early compliance will be confirmed. However, other jurisdictions do not seem to 
follow this same predictive path. While the Bahamas, similar to the Cayman Islands, 
adopted the FATF best practices at the same time as the Caymans, it did not adopt the 
OECD initiatives until almost two years later. Furthermore, Liechtenstein, also quite 
similar to the Cayman Islands, adopted the FATF best practices at the same time but was 
the last to commit itself to the OECD initiative. These anomalies are explored after a 
more careful examination of the Cayman Islands. 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 
Table 4 and the data in Tables 2 & 3 support the argument that the Cayman 
Islands had strong institutional capacity and a high degree of reputational risk at the time 
it was placed on both the FATF and OECD blacklists. To tease out whether these 
factors—high institutional capacity and a high degree of reputational risk—led to the 
Cayman’s quickly complying with both international initiatives, the following section 
focuses in more depth on the Cayman Islands.  
Currently, the Cayman Islands is considered the sixth largest financial center in 
the world in terms of assets. As of 2007, the Cayman Islands held over $1.9 trillion in 
external assets (Palan et al. 2010, 26). A study conducted by Sullivan in that same year 
revealed that the Cayman Islands had 62,752 international business companies (IBCs), 
450 licensed banks, 740 captive insurance companies, and roughly 8,600 mutual/hedge 




Office found that of the 62,752 IBCs, nearly 19,000 were registered at a single address, 
the Ugland House (GAO 2008, 3). These figures are meant to illustrate the size of the 
Cayman Islands’ financial sector; the Cayman Islands has more registered companies 
(62,752) than citizens (54,878). 
Data relating back to the time of the OECD and FATF initiatives, reveal that, 
while the financial sector of the Cayman Islands was smaller relative to its current status, 
it was still extremely large in absolute terms. In 2000, Cayman banks held assets valuing 
$804.5 billion and liabilities valuing $786.1 billion (CIMA 2000, 7).  In the same year, 
the Cayman Islands had 50,951 IBCs, 570 licensed banks (INCS 2000), 665 licensed 
insurance companies, and 3,014 registered mutual funds (CIMA 2000).  Furthermore, not 
only was the raw scale of the Cayman Islands’ OFC sector substantial, but it also played 
a large role in the Cayman’s economy. As Table 3 notes, the Cayman’s fees from the 
OFC sector contributed to 14% of government revenues. This contribution was the 
second largest in the Easter Caribbean Currency Union; only the British Virgin Islands 
received a larger share of government revenues (54.6%) from its OFC sector in 2000 
(Suss et al. 2002, 16). Additionally, the Cayman’s had nearly 11% of its labor force 
locked into the financial sector (Table 3). 
The statistics available regarding the Cayman Islands are far better than those of 
most other OFCs. This is due in large part because the Cayman Islands has better 
regulatory and monitoring structures than most any other OFC. The majority of these 
structures were in place prior to the FATF and OECD initiatives, most likely allowing the 
Caymans to assess its own reputational risk from not complying with the initiatives and 
to comply quickly. Key Cayman public institutions include the following: Minister of 




Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA), the General Registry, the Cayman Islands 
Stock Exchange, and the Financial Reporting Authority (Ridley 2007). In addition to 
these public institutions, the Cayman Islands issues its own currency—one of the only 
OFCs to do this.   
The most significant of all the Cayman’s public institutions is CIMA. CIMA 
“regulates the financial sector, (including monitoring for compliance with AML/CFT 
requirements), i.e. banks, money services providers, trust companies, securities 
(investment funds, fund administrators, brokers, investment managers), insurance 
(captives, general, managers, and agents), company managers and corporate service 
providers” (Ridley 2007, 4).  CIMA was established in 1996 by the Monetary Authority 
Law to replace the Financial Services Supervision Department. CIMA was given broader 
powers to regulate and monitor financial institutions (GAO 2008). These powers were 
extended in 2003 when amendments to the Monetary Authority Law made CIMA 
operationally independent from the Cayman Islands government. CIMA serves as a 
significant monitoring and regulatory agency. Since its inception it has issued quarterly 
and annual statistics on the Cayman Islands financial sector.  
In addition to strong public institutions, the Cayman Islands is perceived by 
outside investors as having a system of laws that support business development. For 
example, the Cayman Islands has “insolvency laws, which provide specific protections 
for creditors and investors” (GAO 2008, 4; Hout 2007). It is clear from public reports that 
the government of the Cayman Islands and Cayman professionals are sensitive to 
outsiders’ perception regarding the jurisdiction’s reputation as a business friendly 
environment. In its 2000 annual report, CIMA contributed the growth of its banking 




institutional investors” (CIMA 2000, 7). A 2004 article from Cayman Financial Review 
entitled ‘Perception v. Perception’ even went so far as to take aim at popular Western 
culture that “include[s] the obligatory negative mention of such [offshore financial] 
centers” (6). The article went further in highlighting the importance the Cayman Islands 
placed on perception: 
Traditionally, offshore centers have seemed to let the poor perceptions persist, 
with some hope that at worse [sic], they do not have a significant negative impact 
on business. More recently, we have seen a major change across jurisdictions with 
the use of marketing and public relations bodies and an increase in public-sector 
funding of such initiatives. There is a clear recognition that maintaining a 
financial center that is commercially successful means maintaining one that has 
integrity, enshrined not only in its laws, but also how it is perceived 
internationally. 
The Cayman Islands’ sensitivity to its perception as a business friendly and law-
abiding jurisdiction have led it to openly balance international legal commitments with 
the interests of its clientele. This cost-benefit weighing is best described by the former 
Chairman of CIMA, Timothy Ridley: 
[T]he jurisdiction operates on the principle that, before a regulatory measure is 
introduced, we must be satisfied that it is necessary, it is appropriate given the 
nature of financial services business in the Cayman Islands, it is proportional to 
the identified risks, we understand the regulatory impact and its benefits outweigh 
its costs. 
(Ridley 2007). 
All of the evidence listed above indicates that by the time of the OECD and FATF 
initiatives, the Cayman Islands was a sophisticated and massive OFC. The Cayman 
Islands had both a high degree of institutional capacity to manage new international 
commitments and a high degree of reputational risk should its reputation be harmed—i.e., 




as a law-abiding, business-friendly OFC be downgraded. Thus, the OECD and FATF 
tactics of blacklisting were likely to bring about compliance by the Cayman Islands 
because it was a jurisdiction highly sensitive to reputational consequences. Moreover, the 
Cayman Islands was likely able to comply so readily with these initiatives because it had 
a sophisticated financial regulatory apparatus headed by CIMA. 
A DEEPER CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Looking at Table 4, one can easily note that the original hypothesis is not 
confirmed. The theory that higher levels of institutional capacity and reputational risk 
will lead to quicker compliance, while appearing valid with regards to the Cayman 
Islands, cannot be extrapolated to other jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions with Low and 
Medium scores complied more readily or near the same rates as those with higher scores. 
For example, Panama complied as quickly as Liechtenstein to the FATF initiative and 
more quickly with the OECD initiative. To tease out these anomalies, the following 
subsections look at Liechtenstein and the Pacific Islands—Niue, Nauru, the Cook Islands, 
and the Marshall Islands—as counterpoints to the Cayman Islands. 
Liechtenstein 
Liechtenstein presents a strong counterpoint to the study of the Cayman Islands. 
Both jurisdictions had high levels of institutional capacity and high degrees of 
reputational risk. In fact, Liechtenstein’s GNI per capita is much higher than the 
Cayman’s—$79,660 compared to $52,500 in 2000. Moreover, Liechtenstein appears to 
be more vulnerable to a reputational downgrade; Liechtenstein relies more heavily on the 
OFC sector for government revenues—30% of Liechtenstein’s government revenues 




revenues come from the OFC sector (Table 3). Nonetheless, Liechtenstein was the last 
jurisdiction of the eleven to comply with the OECD initiative. 
Liechtenstein remained committed to not cooperating with the OECD initiative 
even after suffering direct losses. From 2000 to 2002, government revenues from banks 
fell from 64 million to 27 million Swiss Francs and assets managed fell from 112 billion 
to 96 billion (LBA 2003, 4). As Sharman noted in 2006, “Service providers in 
Switzerland were less willing to advise clients to invest in Liechtenstein, and Singapore 
forbade some banks from the Principality from opening branches because the country 
was still blacklisted by the OECD” (125).  
Despite these adverse consequences, Liechtenstein remained on the OECD 
blacklist until 2009, capitulating only after an international scandal. In 2008, an employee 
of LGT, one of Liechtenstein’s largest banks, broke Liechtenstein’s strict banking 
secrecy laws by selling customer details to Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (Der 
Spiegel 2008; Economist 2008). The customer details revealed that several hundred 
German citizens were hiding funds in Liechtenstein to willfully avoid paying German 
taxes. The incident led to greater international pressure being placed on Liechtenstein to 
relax its banking secrecy laws. Only after the incident was Liechtenstein willing to 
commit itself to the OECD initiative and to begin to cooperate with foreign governments 
on information exchange agreements (Cain 2011).  
Liechtenstein’s differing behavior regarding the two blacklists presents a 
puzzle—i.e., why would Liechtenstein so readily comply with the FATF initiative but not 
the OECD initiative? It is clear from available data that Liechtenstein was not lacking in 
institutional capacity at the time the blacklists were made public. Moreover, 




a stable and law-abiding jurisdiction. Sharman quotes Prince Philip as stating, “The 
danger of being on the [OECD] blacklist is the risk of being put aside. You might find 
yourself with few partners to work with or with only a certain type of client, which could 
drive away the few remaining good clients” (2010, 113). Recent press releases also 
indicate that Liechtenstein has suffered from the 2008 scandal and is placing even more 
emphasis on burnishing its reputation: e.g., “The [Liechtenstein Bankers Association] 
were unanimous in their view that, given the current challenges the banking centre is 
facing, it is essential to continue with the work to uphold the reputation of the financial 
centre at home and abroad.” (LBA 2013a; see also LBA 2013b for more statements 
concerning Liechtenstein’s concern with maintaining its reputation as a sound financial 
center). 
If Liechtenstein is sensitive to its reputation, then why did it take so long—
waiting until an international scandal—to comply with the OECD initiative? One likely 
answer is that accepting the OECD initiative would have done more reputational harm to 
Liechtenstein’s financial sector than not accepting the OECD commitments. The OECD 
commitments required jurisdictions to loosen their bank secrecy laws, agreeing to 
exchange client information with other jurisdictions’ tax authorities upon reasonable 
requests.  
One of Liechtenstein’s primary financial instruments, the Anstalt, points to the 
inference that banking secrecy was of greater importance than being removed from the 
OECD blacklist. The Anstalt is a hybrid legal instrument—resembling the civil law 
foundation and the common law trust—unique to Liechtenstein (Palan et al. 2010, 94).  
Anstalt’s are a favorite instrument of wealthy Europeans for avoiding inheritance taxes. 




its activities. Strict bank secrecy laws protect the identities of the beneficiaries. A tax of 
between 0.5% and 1% is placed on the capital earnings of each Anstalt. These taxes 
contribute a large portion—the exact amount is unknown—to the 30% of government 
revenues obtained from the financial sector (Ibid.). One can glean from the importance of 
the Anstalt to the financial economy of Liechtenstein that the government had a strong 
interest in it and the clients who used it. There was likely a fear that cooperating with the 
OECD initiative would loosen secrecy laws and thus damage the Anstalt’s most attractive 
feature. Consequently, Liechtenstein likely reacted by rejecting OECD compliance until 
it was absolutely necessary. 
The Pacific Islands 
The question regarding the Pacific Islands—the Cook Islands, the Marshall 
Islands, Niue, and Nauru—is not why did they comply when they did, but why did they 
comply at all. The substantial lack of data, with the possible exception of the Cook 
Islands, appears to direct one away from answering this question. However, such a lack 
of data can also reflect institutional weakness. For example, Sharman reports that by 
1998 Nauru suffered from 90 percent unemployment with its national debt reaching 1600 
percent of GDP (2011, 114). A study by van Fossen also reveals that most of these 
jurisdictions received only the slightest of benefits from their OFC sectors (2003). For 
example, the Marshall Islands, relying more heavily on revenues from issuing flags of 
convenience than revenues from its OFC sector, resisted the OECD initiative until 2007 
(Sharman 2006, 125).  
Thus, it appears that most of the Pacific jurisdictions had neither the institutional 
capacity nor the reputational risk necessary to instigate compliance. However, as 




of a reputational downgrade may have had little to do with attracting OFC capital but 
rather with attracting other FDI and, in particular, foreign aid (2011, 113–17). Nauru, a 
small island republic of fewer than 10,000 citizens had come to the attention of 
international authorities because it had been used by Russian criminals to set up shell 
banks in the mid- and late-1990s. However, by the time the FATF and OECD blacklists 
were released, Nauru had virtually no OFC sector. Thus, it would seem that Nauru would 
have all the more reason for resisting compliance with the blacklists. And, indeed Nauru 
resisted up to a point, including vitriolic exchanges with FATF officials and authorities 
from other states. Nevertheless, Nauru was forced to capitulate as the reputational 
consequences of being placed on the blacklists tarnished its reputation to the extent that 
making foreign deals regarding aid or Nauru’s other major economic sector, phosphate, 






The argument that institutional capacity and reputational risk were determinative 
in the Cayman Islands’ quick compliance with the OECD and FATF initiatives has been 
neither falsified nor verified. However, it is clear that this thesis cannot be extrapolated to 
apply more broadly to the other ten jurisdictions appearing on both lists. While 
institutional capacity and reputational risk may be contributing variables in determining 
why and when states complied with the FATF and OECD regimes, they are far from the 
only variables affecting a state’s decision to comply. The following section identifies 
problems encountered during this study and briefly suggests a path forward for further 
study regarding states’ compliance with the FATF and OECD regimes. 
PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT 
The absence of data regarding OFCs is inherently problematic, making cross-
jurisdictional comparisons all the more difficult (Palan et al. 2010, 46–47). The gathering 
and publication of data has been aided by international governance initiatives, such as the 
FATF and OECD blacklists, and the rapid development of information technology. 
Nonetheless, statistical reporting is often clouded by variation across jurisdictions. While 
some countries such as the Cayman’s may report extensively on most elements of their 
financial sector—including IBCs, insurance companies, and hedge funds—other 
countries, such as Panama, may report only data regarding registered banks (IMF 2006). 
Cross-jurisdictional comparisons are challenging because of these variations in the 
availability and types of data reported. 
Moreover, when approaching the two variables—institutional capacity and 




Institutional capacity is often defined using the World Governance Indicators (WGIs). In 
fact, my approach borrowed from that of Murray et al. in an IMF evaluation of Pacific 
Islands (2009). However, there are severe limitations with the WGIs, particularly when 
used in conjunction with assessing reputational risk. Since the WGIs measure perceptions 
rather than reality, they may be more appropriate for assessing reputation. Moreover, the 
WGIs are aggregated from multiple sources; these sources vary across jurisdictions, 
making comparisons using the WGIs far from perfect (see footnote 6). Nevertheless, if 
one were to use the WGIs for measuring reputational risk, then measuring institutional 
capacity would be very difficult as there are no truly independent metrics for institutional 
strength. 
Measuring institutional capacity is made more difficult by the broad reach of the 
term. When studying OFCs, the concern is with only one sliver of a state’s economy and 
its institutional apparatus. Thus, the focus of institutional capacity should really be 
redefined, as attempted here, to mean “financial institutional capacity”. Is the state 
capable of implementing legislation and enforcement mechanisms to support and monitor 
the stability of its financial system? Such a question has become all the more relevant 
after the fallout from the global financial crisis of 2008–09. 
Reputational risk is even harder to define; the literature provides no clear 
definition. This is made more problematic by conflicting views on how to define 
reputation. Most political scientists and economists treat reputation as an objective form 
of social capital, developed over time in something resembling an iterated game. This 
view holds that states have a high degree of control over their reputations and can 
monitor and control it simply by altering their behavior with regards to other states 




According to the standard argument, a major—if not the major—reason why 
states keep commitments, even those that produce a lower level of return than 
expected, is because they fear that any evidence of unreliability will damage their 
current cooperative relationships and lead other states to reduce their willingness 
to enter into future agreements. (2002, 95–96) 
However, as Sharman points out reputation may be more intersubjective than 
objective; i.e., the role of third party perceptions may play a larger role in determining 
reputations rather than the state’s actual behavior (2006, 109–12). Thus, reputation may 
be far removed from objective reality (Eccles et al. 2007). The case of Nauru, as detailed 
above, seems to highlight this point. Despite complying with the FATF and OECD 
initiatives and having virtually no OFC sector, Nauru continues to suffer from a poor 
reputation.  
The risk associated with a reputational downgrade is also difficult to assess. As 
the comparison between Liechtenstein and the Cayman Islands highlights, states may be 
facing different consequences from compliance or noncompliance. Liechtenstein may 
have made a rational choice in choosing not to comply with the OECD initiative, whereas 
the Cayman Islands may have also made a rational choice by complying. This is not to 
say that the FATF and OECD blacklists did not create risks for all the named 
jurisdictions, merely that the risks faced by each jurisdiction for compliance versus 
noncompliance were likely different.  
Unfortunately, most of the economic literature regarding OFCs suggests that there 
is one global OFC market and that jurisdictions are homogenous in their desire to attract 
foreign capital (Desai et al. 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Dharmapala 2008). This line of thinking 
tends to ignore specialization and variation across OFC jurisdictions. OFC jurisdictions 
may specialize in a particular OFC product, such as the Cayman Islands’ focus on hedge 




example, the Liechtenstein Anstalt is a financial and legal instrument that can only be 
found within Liechtenstein.  
These variations across jurisdictions are likely to mean that each jurisdiction is 
servicing a different client base with different preferences. Each client base may be more 
or less sensitive to a reputational downgrade. A criminal attempting to launder money 
may care very little about an OFC’s reputation so long as the reputation does not hinder 
the ability to move money into the global economy. On the other hand, New York 
investors and corporations engaged in tax planning are likely to be very sensitive to an 
OFC’s reputation as stable and law-abiding. To obtain a better grasp of each 
jurisdiction’s reputational risk, one would need a deeper understanding of each 
jurisdiction’s specialization and the corresponding preferences of their client base.  
MOVING FORWARD: A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH SOFT 
LAW 
The hypothesis of this paper should not readily be abandoned. Institutional 
capacity and reputational risk may have been contributing variables to each state’s 
decision to comply with the OECD and FATF initiatives. Moreover, while difficulties in 
data collection and defining contributing variables may continue, cross-jurisdictional 
comparisons between OFCs, though strained, should not be wholly discarded. Even if 
cross-jurisdictional comparisons do not reveal a predictive theory, they tend to reveal a 
more nuanced understanding of individual state behavior, as was the case with this study. 
Moving forward, to better grapple with institutional capacity and reputational risk, 
a broader empirical study across jurisdictions can be conducted. More empirical data 
regarding states’ financial sectors, legal regimes, and government institutions are likely to 




understanding of reputation can be garnered through interviews of persons involved in 
both the supply and demand side of OFC services. Interviews, where and if available, are 
likely to be limited in their scope of information, as the FATF and OECD regimes are 
nearly fifteen years old, and participants may be unwilling to admit true interests or 
motives. To supplement these gaps, information regarding jurisdictions’ reputations 
should be gleaned from public statements both from the jurisdiction and by third parties 
about the jurisdiction. A more robust understanding of state compliance with the FATF 
and OECD initiatives will not only service the literature regarding OFCs, but will also aid 
in understanding state compliance with other types of soft law regimes. Presumably, a 
better understanding of state motivations to comply or not comply may lead to 
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